‘Gender Unrealism’ Theory: Why Desire May Define Who You Are

When someone asks “What makes someone a woman?” the answers usually fall into familiar camps. Some point to biology: chromosomes, anatomy, reproductive systems. Others say it’s about self-identification: you’re a woman if you say you are. Still others focus on power: women are the people society subordinates based on perceived sex.

A new philosophy paper from N.R. Howard and N. Laskowski argues all three camps are missing something crucial. Gender, they claim, isn’t fundamentally about your body, your declaration, or your social position. It’s about what you deeply, genuinely want for yourself. In their words: “You belong to the gender category to which you intrinsically desire to belong.”

That might sound like pop psychology, but the authors mean something specific. By “intrinsically desire,” they’re talking about a core want that isn’t tactical or instrumental. It’s not about going along with certain norms because you’re afraid of consequences or because it’s convenient. It’s about genuinely wanting to live under those norms, to be addressed by certain pronouns, to navigate spaces in certain ways, because that’s what feels right to you.

Published in Ergo: an Open Access Journal of Philosophy, the paper calls this view “Gender Unrealism.” The label comes from feminist philosopher Sally Haslanger, but Howard and Laskowski are reviving ideas from legal scholar Catharine MacKinnon. On their reading, MacKinnon argued that because the concept “woman” was formed under patriarchy, it expresses a masculine perspective rather than objective reality. Gender, in this view, has no existence beyond the patriarchal thought and talk that created it. Gender isn’t an extra ingredient in the world sitting on top of bodies and social arrangements. Someone has a gender when they’re correctly thought and talked about as having it. What makes that correct? Their desires.

The Problem With Biology-Based And Identity-Based Gender Theories

To build their case, Howard and Laskowski tour the standard views and point out the gaps.

Biology-based definitions struggle with non-binary identities. Take Marnie, an agender person they quote: “I don’t really think I’m a man. I’m a person. I went looking for my gender, and I kept not finding anything. I am very relieved to be able to finally stop, and say ‘Stuff it, I’m not a man or a woman, I’m just me.'” If gender just meant male or female biology, how do we make sense of Marnie? The biology view, the authors argue, can’t handle genders that don’t map onto intersex conditions.

Self-identification views sound appealing, especially as ethical guidance: if someone tells you they’re a woman, you should treat them as one. But philosophically, pure self-ID runs into a problem the authors borrow from Plato’s Euthyphro dialogue. Some things (like popularity) really are just about attitudes: you’re popular if people like you. Other things (like piety or justice) aren’t just about attitudes: the gods might love something because it’s pious, not the other way around.

Gender, Howard and Laskowski argue, is more like piety than popularity. It’s not just a matter of declaring yourself a woman. What if someone identifies as a woman purely for tactical reasons, as trans philosopher Talia Mae Bettcher notes some people do? The authors say those tactical cases shouldn’t count. What matters is the underlying, genuine desire, not the surface declaration.

Social position views, like Sally Haslanger’s influential account, tie gender to power: women are people systematically subordinated based on perceived sex; men are systematically privileged. This captures something important about gender’s role in oppression. But as philosopher Mari Mikkola points out, the Queen of England isn’t subordinated, yet she’s still a woman. And there are trans women who aren’t subordinated in those ways but are “no less women for it.” Social position views, the authors argue, miss the internal, psychological dimension of gender.

The Two Questions About Gender Most Theories Get Wrong

Howard and Laskowski’s framework hinges on a key insight: past theories fail because they conflate two separate questions:

1. What is a gender category? (What makes womanhood different from manhood or being agender?)
2. Who belongs to that category? (What makes you specifically a woman?)

The answers can come apart. Think about being a student at a university. What makes someone a student? Admission rules, which can change over time. What is being a student? Going to that university, sharing its culture, participating in its life. The membership conditions aren’t the same as the nature of the category itself.

Applied to gender: social norms and structures make gender categories what they are. The norms around womanhood (use these pronouns, navigate these spaces, expect these interactions) emerge from how society is organized. But what puts you in that category isn’t whether society treats you that way. It’s whether you genuinely want to live under those norms.

Why Desire Matters

Grounding gender in desire does several things. First, it respects agency without making gender purely voluntary. You can’t just decide to be a woman on a whim. But if you deeply, non-instrumentally want to conform to the norms that constitute womanhood in your society, that desire is what makes you a woman.

Second, it handles coercion. Imagine a trans woman living in a hostile environment. She might present as a man because it’s safer, responding to male pronouns and using men’s bathrooms. But she doesn’t genuinely want to live that way. She’s only doing it instrumentally, to avoid harm. On Howard and Laskowski’s view, she is still a woman because her core desire is to live under the norms of womanhood, even if fear keeps her from doing so outwardly.

Third, it explains degrees and in-between cases. Because the theory talks about “the degree” to which you desire to conform to various norms, it can make sense of people who feel partially attached to multiple gender categories or who shift over time.

Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, it explains why misgendering is morally wrong, not just factually mistaken. On this view, when you call someone “she,” you’re not just describing her. You’re expressing a plan to treat her according to certain norms. If she genuinely wants to be treated that way, you have a reason to do it. Misgendering someone means ignoring what they deeply want for themselves. That’s a form of disrespect.

The Objections

What about internalized oppression? If patriarchal societies shape women’s desires, doesn’t this theory risk saying women want their own subjugation?

Howard and Laskowski have two responses. First, you can want to do something without wanting to want it. Someone might desire to conform to subjugating norms while also wishing she didn’t have those desires, wishing she could resist. Second, they argue it’s actually a feature, not a bug, that their theory acknowledges how socialization works. Patriarchy shapes gender partly by shaping desires. The theory helps explain how that happens.

The authors also acknowledge their view raises questions about desire formation under oppression that they don’t fully resolve. How do we know which desires are “genuine” versus products of coercion? That’s a hard problem for any desire-based theory, in gender or beyond.

How This Theory Changes the Way We Think About Gender

“Gender Unrealism” offers a philosophical framework, not a policy prescription. But it does suggest some practical implications. Treat people according to the gender norms they genuinely want to live under, not the ones you think fit their body or social position. Listen when people tell you about their gender, because that’s often the best evidence of their desires. And recognize that misgendering isn’t a minor slip. It’s ignoring something central to how a person wants to move through the world.

The theory also reframes some feminist debates. The authors argue that improving gender justice isn’t about constructing “better gender realities,” as some realist philosophers suggest. It’s simpler: treat people well according to what they genuinely want. Gender justice is its own end, not a means to reshaping metaphysical reality.

Whether Howard and Laskowski’s framework ultimately succeeds as philosophy remains to be seen. But in a landscape where debates about gender often talk past each other, their attempt to distinguish what gender categories are from who belongs to them offers a new way to think through old conflicts.

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Disclaimer: This article summarizes a philosophical paper for general readers. It is not legal, medical, or professional advice regarding gender identity. If you are seeking guidance on gender-related matters, consult qualified professionals.

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