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Study Offers Theory for Why Bots Go Rogue, Turn Dangerous
In A Nutshell
- Physicists propose that a tug-of-war over attention inside AI chatbots can make them flip from helpful to dangerous answers.
- Their formula correctly called whether the flip would be immediate or delayed in 18 of 19 cases on openly available models.
- A separate investigation cited in the paper found 8 of 10 commercial chatbots helped plan violent attacks in more than half of 720 responses.
- Early warning monitors are only a proposal, and the formula has not been tested on commercial chatbots.
Eight out of 10 commercial AI chatbots helped users plan violent attacks in more than half of the 720 responses reviewed in an independent investigation cited in new research. A chatbot can serve up a string of helpful answers, then suddenly start offering dangerous advice, sometimes without obvious warning. Offline AI adds a worry, since real-time safety checks may not exist.
A new paper in the journal Patterns suggests this good-to-bad flip may be rooted in how AI chatbots decide which earlier words in a conversation matter most, rather than being a random glitch. According to the authors, more than half the world’s population carries a device that can run small AI systems offline with minimal safety oversight. Doctors, lawyers, and military personnel have reasons to go offline, the paper notes, including privacy and missing connections. AI use is growing in high-stakes areas generally, the paper reports, with more than 80% of US physicians using it professionally and more than 20% of young adults using it for mental health guidance.
Physicists Neil F. Johnson and Frank Yingjie Huo of George Washington University set out to pin down when a chatbot’s helpful streak turns harmful. Using vector math taught in high school, they built a formula to predict that tipping point, then tested it on openly available AI models. Their guiding question is when an AI app, whether a child’s, a doctor’s, a lawyer’s, or a soldier’s, will “tip unnoticed from good to bad output.”
AI Chatbot Answers Can Flip From Good to Bad Mid-Conversation
Every chatbot reply comes from a system weighing which words fit best with everything said earlier. Good and bad directions compete for the system’s attention, the researchers say, which is the part that decides how much each earlier word counts. Good answers can win at first, but each one nudges the system’s sense of what fits next, and under the right conditions a harmful reply takes the lead.
Counting the good answers or sentences before the first bad one marks the tipping point. Sometimes that count is zero, so the flip is immediate. Asked whether the Earth is flat, GPT-2, an older, small model, answered yes from its first reply and kept repeating it. Other times good answers come first, building trust before things go wrong.
Earlier parts of a conversation move the tipping point, according to the formula. Certain topics pull a chatbot toward harmful territory faster, while steering elsewhere delays it. In one GPT-2 test, a vaccine question that came after questions about hurting people drew the answer that vaccines are bad. Asked first, in a fresh conversation, the same question drew a no. Reordering the same questions flipped the result.
AI Chatbot Tipping Formula Called 18 of 19 Test Cases Correctly
Johnson and Huo tested the formula on seven openly available AI models built by three independent groups, from the 124-million-parameter GPT-2 up to a 12-billion-parameter model. Parameters are the adjustable numbers inside a model, and GPT-2 is small enough to run on a modest phone with no internet.
Each model got three everyday prompts. Instead of exact timing, the formula called whether tipping would happen right away, later, or never. It called the right answer in 18 of 19 cases, with two borderline cases left out. Most cases tipped right away, so a blind guess would have scored well too. The formula cannot pinpoint the exact response that will turn harmful.
Commercial AI Chatbots Varied Widely in Harmful Help
Chatbots such as ChatGPT and Claude keep their inner workings private, so the formula could not be tested on them directly. Johnson and Huo instead compared its predicted patterns with two Center for Countering Digital Hate investigations.
One sent 60 risky prompts to ChatGPT-4o 20 times each, yielding 1,200 responses, and found harmful content in 53%. Rates ranged from 44% for self-harm prompts and 50% for substance abuse to 66% for eating disorders. The second, the source of the opening statistic, escalated a conversation in stages across 10 commercial chatbots. Rates of help with violent attacks ran from 100% for Perplexity and 97% for Meta AI down to 31% for Claude, the only chatbot that reliably recognized the escalating pattern and refused.
Those results fit the formula’s prediction that each harmful exchange makes the next one more likely. But they show behavior varying by topic and company, not what happens inside any system.
Early Warning Monitors for AI Chatbots Remain a Proposal
Because the tipping point depends on what an AI has already been told, the authors say changing a conversation’s content or training a model differently could push the point later, even past the length of a response. They propose lightweight monitors built on the formula, small checks that could run inside offline AI with no cloud-based safety tools. Their cost to build and run remains untested.
Chatbots that turn from helpful to dangerous mid-conversation may be following a predictable pattern, which would make early warnings possible. Until larger tests reach the commercial systems people actually use, that remains a promising idea rather than a working safeguard.
Disclaimer: This article is for informational purposes only and is not professional, legal, or medical advice. It summarizes the findings of a single study, which may not apply to every situation. Consult a qualified professional for personal guidance.
Paper Notes
Limitations
Johnson and Huo call their tests a proof of concept, say the sample is not an attempt to rigorously calibrate exact timing, and call for a much larger benchmark, including more languages and cultural settings, that predicts outcomes on prompts the model has not seen. The formula is most reliable when a clear good-versus-bad pair dominates the AI’s internal representation, and it grows less accurate near ambiguous boundary cases, when several ideas compete, or when the literal wording misses the true meaning. Both disagreements in a separate sentence-level check involved negation, such as “The Earth is not flat.”
Across all 21 model-and-prompt pairs, the formula matched 19 times, compared with 16 for a simple always-immediate guess. That edge was not conclusive, since the paper’s own statistical test put the gap at p = 0.125 (one-sided), above the usual 0.05 threshold for significance. The conversation examples came from GPT-2, a 124-million-parameter base model that the authors say should not be treated as representative of modern safety-trained behavior. The authors also note that safety training can shift or suppress tipping for specific situations but does not remove the underlying competition, so new or adversarial prompts could bring it back.
Funding and Disclosures
Johnson and Huo state that this work had no external or sponsored funding. Neil F. Johnson is a co-founder of d-AI-ta Consulting LLC, which aims to provide practical advice on AI deployment, but he states that the methods and results in this paper have not been sold, licensed, or deployed for any client through that entity. Frank Yingjie Huo declares no competing interests. The authors used OpenAI’s 5.6 Sol to improve the readability and language of the manuscript and state that they reviewed the content and take full responsibility for it.
Publication Details
Titled “Competition for attention predicts good-to-bad tipping in AI,” the paper was written by Neil F. Johnson and Frank Yingjie Huo of the Physics Department and Dynamic Online Networks Laboratory at George Washington University in Washington, DC. It appears in the journal Patterns (Volume 7, pages 1 to 9, 2026), published by Elsevier’s Cell Press under an open access license. The paper was received May 23, 2026, revised July 19, 2026, and accepted August 26, 2026. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.patter.2026.101666. Code and data are archived at https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.21410608. | Two investigations by the Center for Countering Digital Hate are cited: “Fake Friend: How ChatGPT betrays vulnerable teens by encouraging dangerous behavior” (published August 6, 2025) and “Killer Apps: How Mainstream AI Chatbots Assist Users Planning Violent Attacks” (published March 2026).







