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Told to Ignore a Source, People Still Lean on It
In A Nutshell
- People told a source was a coin flip still leaned toward the color it showed.
- A model of their choices estimated they treated coin-flip sources as right about 54% to 62% of the time.
- Sources labeled as usually wrong were underused, even though reversing their advice would have helped.
- Participants showed some awareness of being swayed, yet kept leaning on the sources.
A source labeled 50% reliable is no better than a coin flip, and a new study shows that people lean on it anyway. Participants were told in plain terms to ignore these sources, yet their choices drifted toward whatever color the useless sources pointed to. They showed some awareness of being swayed, and it did not stop them.
Researchers from Britain, Japan, Germany, and France ran five online experiments, reported in PLOS Computational Biology, to see how people use reliability scores.
Labels like these are common online, from star ratings on products to fact-check flags on social posts. The experiments used colored squares instead of real news, so the results do not show how people handle actual misinformation. They offer a controlled look at what happens when a number says to stop trusting a source.
Unreliable Sources Swayed Choices in All Five Online Experiments
Of the 158 people recruited online from the United Kingdom, 109 were women, and average ages in each experiment ran from about 25 to 30. After 18 who rushed through the task were removed, 140 remained, in groups of 23 to 32 per experiment.
On each round, participants watched six colored squares, red or blue, each predicting the correct color for that round. A percentage above every square showed how often that source told the truth. Sources above 50% were right more often than wrong. Sources at exactly 50%, the unreliable ones, were pure coin flips. Sources below 50% were usually wrong, so a sharp participant would bet on the opposite color. After the sixth square, participants picked a color and learned whether they were correct. Each person completed roughly 300 rounds.
Source mixes changed across experiments. Two used coin-flip and mostly right sources, two added a usually wrong source to the mix, and one used only coin-flip and usually wrong sources.
Participants beat random guessing, picking the correct color about 58% to 64% of the time. Even so, coin-flip sources left a mark in every experiment. When more of the 50% squares showed blue, participants grew more likely to pick blue, even though those squares held no information. A statistical model of the choices estimated that people treated these sources as right between about 54% and 62% of the time. In effect, no information became a little information. The authors floated several explanations, including that seeing a color repeatedly may nudge preference toward it, and that people may have used the useless squares to break ties when the real evidence was thin. The coin-flip pull was weaker in the two experiments that mixed mostly right and usually wrong sources, perhaps, the authors say, because reading colors both ways made the colors themselves matter less.
Sources That Are Usually Wrong Proved Hardest to Use
Sources labeled below 50% caused a different problem. A source that is wrong most of the time is valuable once its advice gets reversed, and a 35% source carries as much information as a 65% one. Participants did not treat them equally. Their choices followed the wrong sources less than they should have, and accuracy fell in the experiment where every source was either a coin flip or usually wrong, compared with the matching experiment using mostly right sources. Smaller dips in two other experiments could have been chance.
Order mattered, too. The last square counted for more than the first, with the first square’s influence running 11% to 40% lower than the last square’s, depending on the experiment. In the researchers’ model, that fading looked stronger in the experiment where most sources were misleading. The authors propose that flipping a source’s advice is mentally costly, which may strain short-term memory for earlier squares.
Participants Sensed the Pull of Unreliable Sources but Kept Following Them
In the last two experiments, 64 participants rated, after each choice, how much one randomly chosen group of squares, such as the 65% ones, had influenced them, on a scale running from going against the squares, through no influence, to going along with them.
Ratings moved in step with the evidence. The more coin-flip squares that agreed with a person’s pick, the more that person said those squares had nudged the decision. Across individuals, people who leaned harder on a given source tended to report feeling its influence more strongly.
Yet the authors suggest that “awareness of bias is not necessarily sufficient to overcome it.” The experiments never tested whether people could resist when asked to, so an inability to resist is an interpretation, not a proven limit. One possible reason, the authors say, is that the bias was not tied to a clear drop in accuracy in most experiments, so resisting it may not have seemed worth the effort. A real-world version might be a flagged post whose claim still lingers in a reader’s mind.
A coin flip labeled as a coin flip still tugged at people’s choices. Designers of credibility scores and fact-check flags should test how people respond to labels, not assume a clear label does the work.
Disclaimer: This article reports on the findings of a single peer-reviewed study and is intended for general informational purposes only. It is not professional, medical, financial, or legal advice, and results from controlled experiments may not apply to every situation.
Paper Notes
Limitations
Several open questions remain, according to the authors. A setting in the choice model that controls how random decisions are could not be separated from the setting that measures how much people distorted reliability, so exact figures, including the 54% to 62% range, depend on the model’s assumptions and are best read as a general pattern. The experiments used only a few distinct reliability levels, which made it hard to tell whether reliably wrong sources were processed differently from reliably correct ones. Individual-level estimates of how much weight people gave early versus late squares carried some estimation bias, so those figures reflect relative patterns more than exact values. Design differences between experiments suggest that asking for influence ratings may itself have changed how people remembered the sequence. The influence rating is also a new measure, and the authors say its validity still needs testing. Because ratings were organized by source reliability rather than by position in the sequence, the study could not test whether participants were aware of their tendency to favor later squares. The task used colored squares rather than real news, and participants were recruited online in the United Kingdom, with more women than men and average ages from the mid-20s to 30. Several explanations for why coin-flip sources swayed choices, including repeated exposure to a color, tie-breaking, and doubt about the instructions, were not distinguished by the data.
Funding and Disclosures
Economic and Social Research Council grant ES/V00378X/1, awarded to Lucie Charles and Patrick Haggard, supported the work. The DI2S2C team was acknowledged for computing resources and facilities. The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript. The authors declared no competing interests. Procedures were approved by the Research Ethics Committee of University College London, and all participants gave written informed consent online. The authors also disclosed that they used ChatGPT for language editing and both ChatGPT and Claude to help revise and debug analysis code, and that all AI-generated code suggestions were reviewed line by line and checked with sanity tests.
Publication Details
Keiji Ota (University College London, Queen Mary University of London, and University of Tsukuba), Anthony Ciston (Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences), Patrick Haggard (University College London), Thibault Gajdos Preuss (Aix Marseille University), and Lucie Charles (University College London and Queen Mary University of London) wrote the study, “How does explicit reliability guide choices? Effect of trustworthiness on choice and metacognition.” Thibault Gajdos Preuss and Lucie Charles contributed equally, and Charles is the corresponding author ([email protected]). It appeared in PLOS Computational Biology, volume 22, issue 10, article e1014818, published October 9, 2026, after acceptance on September 11, 2026. The editor was Hugues Berry of Inria. DOI: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1014818 (https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1014818). Citation: Ota K, Ciston A, Haggard P, Preuss TG, Charles L (2026) How does explicit reliability guide choices? Effect of trustworthiness on choice and metacognition. PLoS Comput Biol 22(10): e1014818. The paper is open access under a Creative Commons Attribution License, and the data and code are shared at https://osf.io/2c6hy/overview.







