conspiracy theorist

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No side is entirely free of bias.

In A Nutshell

  • Conservatives show higher belief in conspiracy theories and are more willing to spread science misinformation, even after accounting for analytical thinking and education
  • Both liberals and conservatives engage in motivated reasoning equally when evaluating political arguments, accepting flawed logic that supports their views and rejecting sound logic that challenges them
  • Analytical thinking helps people spot logical fallacies across the political spectrum but doesn’t protect against conspiracy beliefs or misinformation sharing
  • Believing truth is subjective rather than objective predicts greater susceptibility to conspiracy theories and pseudo-profound nonsense, regardless of political orientation

Conservatives are more likely than liberals to believe conspiracy theories and share fake science news. But when it comes to bending the truth to support their political team, both sides do it equally.

That’s the key finding from a large Swedish study that tracked how people across the political spectrum responded to different types of misinformation. Across three studies with samples of 1,005 (Sweden), 417 (U.K.), and 1,008 (Sweden) — with one Swedish sample analyzed in two separate papers — the research offers a more nuanced picture than the usual “one side is worse” narrative that dominates debates about fake news.

Author Julia Aspernäs, from the Department of Behavioural Sciences and Learning at Linköping University in Sweden, found evidence of both symmetries and asymmetries in misinformation susceptibility. It all depends on what type of misinformation you’re looking at.

The Conspiracy Theory Gap

When researchers asked people about conspiracy theories, like whether the science behind global warming has been invented or distorted, or whether experiments with new drugs are routinely carried out on the public without their knowledge or consent, conservatives consistently believed them more often than liberals. This pattern held up even after accounting for other factors like education level and thinking styles.

The gap extended to sharing behavior too. When participants encountered scientific results in a fictional social media scenario covering controversial topics like gender differences, organized crime, and unemployment, conservatives reported higher willingness to post misleading summaries that twisted the research to match their views.

U.S. Politics - Democrats and Republicans, donkey and elephant on flag
Both sides of the political aisle can’t help but see the world their way. (© Victor Moussa – stock.adobe.com)

When Both Sides Play the Same Game

Aspernäs also tested whether people could spot flawed logic in political arguments. They created puzzles where participants had to figure out if a conclusion actually followed from the evidence presented—like a detective checking if the clues really point to the suspect.

Some arguments had conservative conclusions. Others had liberal ones. The trick was that participants were told to ignore whether they agreed with the content and just check if the logic worked.

Both liberals and conservatives failed this test in the same way. When an argument supported their political views, they’d often accept it even when the logic was broken. When an argument opposed their views, they’d reject it even when the reasoning was sound.

A conservative might nod along to a logically flawed argument for tax cuts. A liberal might do the same for a poorly reasoned argument about wealth inequality. Neither side was better at catching their own bias.

This matters because it suggests that when people have skin in the game politically, they bend facts at similar rates regardless of ideology.

The Thinking Style That Helps

One trait did protect people from some types of misinformation: taking time to think things through rather than going with gut instinct.

Aspernäs tested this with trick questions. Here’s an example: “A bat and a ball cost 110 kronor total. The bat costs 100 kronor more than the ball. How much does the ball cost?”

Most people immediately think “10 kronor.” But if you pause and work it out, the answer is actually 5 kronor.

People who caught these tricks were better at spotting logical flaws in political arguments, whether conservative or liberal. Slowing down and double-checking your instincts appeared to help people resist at least some forms of bias.

But analytical thinking wasn’t a cure-all. It helped with logic puzzles but didn’t stop people from believing conspiracy theories or sharing misleading science posts. Something else was going on there.

The ‘Your Truth’ Problem

Aspernäs uncovered another factor that has been almost completely neglected in misinformation research: what people believe about truth itself.

Some people lean toward thinking truth is objective: either the earth is round or it isn’t, regardless of anyone’s opinion. Others lean toward thinking truth is personal or subjective. Someone with strong subjectivist beliefs might agree that “truth is nothing more than a person’s subjective experience of the world.”

People with stronger subjectivist beliefs about truth were more likely to fall for impressive-sounding nonsense, believe conspiracy theories, and report willingness to share fake science news. This held true across the political spectrum. It wasn’t that conservatives believed truth was more subjective, they just happened to believe more conspiracy theories for other reasons.

This finding points to a deeper vulnerability than political bias. If someone thinks truth depends on personal feelings rather than evidence, they may be more susceptible to misinformation that triggers the right emotions, regardless of facts.

Conservatives consistently believed conspiracies more often.
Conservatives consistently believed conspiracies more often. (Credit: Dmytro Sheremeta on Shutterstock)

Why the Conservative Vulnerability?

The study doesn’t fully explain why conservatives show higher rates of conspiracy belief. It’s not that they’re worse at analytical thinking or more biased in general; the research found them similar to liberals on those dimensions.

One possibility is that conservative ideology attracts people with certain personality traits, like stronger distrust of institutions, that also make conspiracy theories more appealing. Another is that right now, many popular conspiracy theories happen to align with conservative narratives, though this wouldn’t explain why the pattern shows up even with politically neutral conspiracies.

Aspernäs stresses that the findings describe group averages, not individuals. Plenty of conservatives reject conspiracy theories completely. Plenty of liberals believe them. The differences, while real, are modest.

What It Means

Both sides engage in motivated reasoning when their political identity is threatened. But conservatives show an additional vulnerability to conspiracy thinking and science misinformation that appears separate from this bias.

This creates a challenge for fighting fake news. Different problems need different solutions. Teaching people to check their logic might help with motivated reasoning. But conspiracy beliefs might require addressing deeper issues about trust in institutions. And if someone fundamentally believes truth is subjective, fact-checking might not work at all.

It’s worth noting that the study was conducted in Sweden and the United Kingdom, where the political landscape differs from the United States. American conservatives might show different patterns than Swedish or British ones. But the finding that misinformation susceptibility isn’t one-dimensional — that people can be resistant to some types while vulnerable to others — likely applies across cultures.

Perhaps the biggest takeaway is this: accusations that “the other side” is uniquely prone to fake news miss the mark. Everyone has vulnerabilities. They just show up in different ways depending on what you’re measuring.


Paper Notes

Limitations

The research used online surveys where people reported their own beliefs and stated willingness rather than tracking actual behavior. People may not always accurately report what they believe, or their survey responses might not match how they’d act in real situations. The science misinformation measure used hypothetical social media scenarios rather than observing what people actually share online.

One study asked participants to evaluate logical arguments but instructed them not to think too long before answering, which might have accidentally encouraged snap judgments over careful reasoning. An attempt to experimentally manipulate people’s beliefs about truth was unsuccessful, preventing conclusions about whether believing truth is subjective actually causes greater susceptibility to misinformation.

All participants came from Sweden or the United Kingdom. Patterns might differ in other countries with different political cultures and media environments.

Funding and Disclosures

Funding sources and potential conflicts of interest are not specified in the thesis document.

Publication Details

Author: Julia Aspernäs, Department of Behavioural Sciences and Learning, Division of Psychology, Linköping University | Supervisors: Arvid Erlandsson (main supervisor) and Artur Nilsson (co-supervisor) | Document Type: Doctoral dissertation (Linköping Studies in Arts and Sciences No. 921, 2025; Linköping Studies in Behavioural Science No. 271) | Institution: Linköping University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences, Sweden | DOI: https://doi.org/10.3384/9789181183009 | ISBN: 978-91-8118-299-6 (print); 978-91-8118-300-9 (PDF) | Published: 2025

The thesis comprises three papers:

  • Paper I: Aspernäs, J., Erlandsson, A., & Nilsson, A. (2022). Motivated formal reasoning: Ideological belief bias in syllogistic reasoning across diverse political issues. Thinking & Reasoning, 29(1), 43–69. DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2022.2038268
  • Paper II: Aspernäs, J., Erlandsson, A., & Nilsson, A. (2023). Misperceptions in a post-truth world: Effect of subjectivism and cultural relativism on bullshit receptivity and conspiracist ideation. Journal of Research in Personality, 105, 104394. DOI: 10.1016/j.jrp.2023.104394
  • Paper III: Aspernäs, J., Nilsson, A., & Erlandsson, A. (2025). The role of truth relativist and realist views in bullshit receptivity, conspiracy ideation, and the distribution of science misinformation. Manuscript under revision for Royal Society Open Science.

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